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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the time of this writing, 12 years have passed since Congress enacted 
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),1 which was 
intended to balance the urgent need for copyright protection on the Internet2 
against the equally pressing need to protect Internet service providers (“ISPs”) 
from secondary liability for copyright infringement.3  The rights of three 
parties are involved: (1) copyright owners, who create expressive works for 
publication, (2) ISPs, who provide access to the Internet and services on the 
Internet, and (3) Internet users. 
Congress’s balancing Act resulted in a “safe harbor” provision within the 
DMCA for ISPs.4  According to the provision, as long as ISPs promptly 
respond to allegations of copyright infringement sent to them by a copyright 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 2. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing S. 
REP. NO. 105–190 at 21 (1998)). 
 3. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200–01 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 4. § 512. 
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owner, they are protected from liability for having hosted and distributed any 
infringing material uploaded by Internet users.5 
An issue has arisen that reveals a thumb on the balance scale in favor of 
two parties—copyright owners and ISPs—at the expense of the third—Internet 
users.  The DMCA permits the party who is in the best position to assess 
whether infringement is taking place, the copyright owner,6 to remove content 
from the Internet quickly while bearing little burden of showing any actual 
copyright infringement.7  The copyright owner sends what is known as a 
“takedown” notification to the ISP to have the allegedly infringing content 
removed.  Upon receiving the notification, the ISP removes the content and is 
absolved of liability.  But the copyright owners need only have a subjective 
good-faith belief that their work is being infringed in order to send the 
takedown,8 and subjective good faith is a low threshold for an extrajudicial 
process, particularly when free speech is at stake.9 
Takedowns often mask ulterior motives, such as silencing criticism of a 
religion.10  Copyright owners are sending takedown notifications by the 
millions,11 removing the online content of business competitors,12 video 
 
 5. § 512(c)(1)(C) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service 
provider . . . upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity.”).  There are other requirements for safe harbor that are not the subject of this paper.  For 
instance, the ISP must not have actual knowledge of infringing material.  § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 6. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA 
notification procedures place the burden of . . . identifying the potentially infringing material . . . 
squarely on the owners of the copyright.”); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (In copyright-infringement 
litigation, “the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the prima facie case”). 
 7. See Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1007 (holding that the DMCA requires only a subjective good-
faith belief by the copyright holder that online content is infringing). 
 8. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
 9. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 682 (“[T]he implications for expression on the Internet of 
this extrajudicial process appear, from our limited data, significant.  Removal of speech from the 
Internet, with very little or no process, is a strong remedy for allegations of infringement.”). 
 10. See Nate Anderson, Scientology Fights Critics with 4,000 DMCA Takedown Notices, 
ARS TECHNICA, Sept. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/09/scientology-fights-
critics-with-4000-dmca-takedown-notices.ars; Doug Bedell, Marketers Join Fight on Spam, THE 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 3D (“The Church of Scientology got Google to 
remove links to certain Web sites critical of the religion, citing potential violations of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.”). 
 11. Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube Magic: Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Hired Eyes Make 
Sure that Copyrighted Videos Are Yanked from the Web, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at A1 
(copyright-enforcement company Bay TSP sends over one million takedown notices each month). 
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bloggers,13 hobbyists,14 critics,15 and others engaging in political speech—
including both presidential candidates in 2008.16  For example, during the 
Olympics in Beijing, the International Olympic Committee ordered the 
removal of a protest video by Students for a Free Tibet.17  The video’s title 
suggested the video contained copyrighted Olympic footage.18 Instead it was 
the students protesting China’s policies.  Either the International Olympic 
Committee never watched the video or the real reason for the takedown was to 
silence the students.  The problem is that copyright owners do not need to meet 
any objective criteria when accusing Internet users of copyright infringement. 
The forgotten party in the notice-and-takedown exchange is the innocent 
Internet user whose material vanishes from the Internet.  The DMCA does 
include a “putback” provision for Internet users that allows them to restore 
their content by sending a counter notification,19 but ISPs are not required to 
inform users how to use it,20 and consequently it receives little use.21  
Moreover, the putback provision will not always help Internet users because 
 
 12. Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F.Supp.2d 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Urban, supra 
note 9, at 651 (the authors’ data show that 55% of the takedown notices sent to the Google search 
engine were competitor related). 
 13. Wendy Seltzer, DMCA “Repeat Infringers”: Scientology Critic’s Account Reinstated 
After Counter-Notification, CHILLING EFFECTS, June 6, 2008, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ 
weather.cgi?WeatherID=605. 
 14. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151–52 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Canada Post Plays Grinch in Censorship Row, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Jan. 26, 2009, at B02, available at http://www.thestar.com/sciencetech/article/577112 (The 
Canada Post sent a takedown notification to remove a video criticizing the Post’s CEO); 
Kembrew McLeod, Uri Geller Bends the Web to His Will: The ‘Psychic’ May Be Abusing 
Copyright Law to Make Embarrassing Clips Vanish, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A21. 
 16. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don’t Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A29 
(political videos being removed from YouTube); Letter from Trevor Potter, John McCain 
presidential campaign to Chad Hurley, Chief Executive Officer, YouTube (Oct. 13, 2008), 
(arguing that McCain campaign videos are being removed from YouTube by takedown notices 
but should be left online because they are fair use), available at http://www.eff.org/files/ 
McCain%20YouTube%20copyright%20letter%2010.13.08.pdf. 
 17. Steven Seidenberg, Copyright in the Age of YouTube, ABA J., Feb. 2009, at 46, 48 
(explaining that the title of the students’ video suggested the video contained copyrighted 
Olympic material, but “a cursory look at the video would have demonstrated otherwise”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2006). 
 20. See § 512(g)(2) (the statute only requires the ISP to notify the user of the takedown). 
 21. See Urban, supra note 9, at 679 (“[C]oncerns . . . about the number of flaws revealed in 
our data would be somewhat diminished if we had found evidence of counternotices and 
putback.”  The authors speculated the lack of evidence of counternotices could be due to the 
particular sample of their data). 
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the DMCA requires ISPs to close the accounts of so-called repeat infringers,22 
without defining what a repeat infringer is.23  So ISPs close users’ accounts 
simply in response to receiving multiple takedown notifications, whether or not 
the users were infringing anyone’s copyright.24 
In August 2008 the case law took a dramatic turn.  Internet user Stephanie 
Lenz challenged a takedown notification on the grounds of fair use, and the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied defendant 
Universal Music Corporation’s motion to dismiss.25  Lenz stated a valid claim 
by arguing that Universal could not have believed in good-faith that Lenz’s 
home video of her child dancing infringed the copyright of the video’s 
background music, the Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy.”26  This was the first 
successful, real claim attacking good-faith belief in the ten years since the 
DMCA was enacted.27 
This paper proposes that, given the extrajudicial nature of the takedown 
process, the proper standard for sending a takedown notification is for 
copyright owners to conduct an initial review of the website sufficient to form 
a good-faith belief.  In addition, courts should allocate the burden of proving 
the copyright owner’s good-faith belief on the copyright owner, not on the 
Internet user. 
 
 22. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a 
service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably implemented . . . a 
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”). 
 23. David Nimmer, Repeat Infringers, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 170 (2005) 
(calling the repeat-infringer provision, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i), “entirely fuzzy” and an “amorphous 
legacy from Congress”). 
 24. E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCbill, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (when the 
ISP IBill receives a    DMCA notification after having received previous complaints about the 
same client, it terminates the client’s account).  David Nimmer says IBill’s policy is 
“unobjectionable.”  Nimmer, supra note 23, at 215 n.223.  See also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 
F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1165-66 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Chloe Albanesius, PC MAGAZINE.COM, Judge: 
Veoh’s Transcoding Is Not Piracy, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,23291 
29,00.asp (When “Veoh receives a complaint about a user after a first warning has been issued,” 
it deletes the user’s account including all videos and blocks the user’s email address.). 
 25. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 26. Id. at 1153. 
 27. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (the 
defendant Diebold “appear[ed] to have acknowledged that at least some of the emails [were] 
subject to fair use doctrine” and never showed an email that contained protected content); see also 
Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Viacom Admits Error—Takes Steps to Protect 
Fair Use on YouTube (Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/04/ 
viacom-admits-error-takes-steps-protect-fair-use-youtube (MoveOn.org and Brave New Films 
dismissed their lawsuit against Viacom when Viacom conceded it sent a takedown notification to 
YouTube in error). 
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II.  THE LAW 
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was implemented 
after a perceived breakdown in jurisprudence over how to apply concepts of 
liability (including contributory and vicarious liability) to ISPs.28  Two cases in 
particular caused alarm among ISPs: Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena29 in 
1993, and Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services30 in 1995. 
In Frena, the operator of a discussion group on the Internet31 was held 
directly liable for group members’ infringing activities.32  Members were 
posting copyrighted images owned by Playboy Enterprises,33 and although the 
operator claimed he was not aware that the images were being posted,34 his 
service was distributing and displaying them in violation of the Copyright 
Act.35 He was found liable for copyright infringement himself,36 
notwithstanding his lack of knowledge of the infringing activities.37  Hence 
Frena introduced serious risks for anyone operating email lists, message 
boards, and other predecessors of services like YouTube, Facebook, and 
MySpace. 
Religious Technology Center was an infringement action against another 
Internet discussion-group operator, Thomas Klemesrud—and against his ISP, 
Netcom Communication Services, one of the largest ISPs in the United States 
at the time.38  Netcom was not found directly liable for copyright infringement, 
but a genuine issue of fact precluded Netcom’s motion for summary judgment 
as to contributory liability.39  One of the discussion group’s members was 
 
 28. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 187 (2003). 
 29. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 30. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 31. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554. 
 32. Id. at 1559. 
 33. Id. at 1554. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1556–57. 
 36. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. 
 37. Id. (“It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of the copyright 
infringement.  Intent to infringe is not needed to find copyright infringement . . . thus even an 
innocent infringer is liable.”). 
 38. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 
(N.D. Cal. 1995).  A direct infringement action was also brought against the subscriber to the 
bulletin-board service, Dennis Erlich.  Id. at 1365–66. 
 39. Id. at 1361–62. 
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posting copyrighted Church of Scientology material.40  The copyright owner, 
Religious Technology Center, asked Klemesrud and Netcom to either stop or 
block the member’s posts.41  Netcom replied that it was unable to “screen” 
each post individually, nor could it block one member without blocking all of 
them.42  Still the court held that Netcom was potentially liable for contributory 
infringement because it may have known about the infringing messages.43  
Netcom had been notified of the infringing activity44 and it substantially 
participated in infringement by circulating the messages.45 
These and similar cases caused ISPs to lobby Congress for immunity from 
lawsuits based on Internet users’ actions.46  It worked.  The Senate report 
pertaining to the DMCA states, “without clarification of their liability, service 
providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of 
the speed and capacity of the Internet.  In the ordinary course of their 
operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them 
to potential copyright infringement liability.”47  Congress also recognized that 
ISPs’ actions are automatized, writing “[t]he DMCA was enacted . . . to 
provide immunity to service providers from copyright infringement liability for 
‘passive,’ ‘automatic’ actions in which a service provider’s system engages 
through a technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of 
the service provider.”48 
The section of the DMCA concerning takedown notifications is 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512: “Limitations on liability relating to material online.”49  Congress drafted 
four subsections that provide safe harbors for the types of actions engaged in 
by ISPs.  The first, § 512(a), provides protection for the transmission and 
routing of digital information though an ISP’s network.50  An example of this 
would be the transmission and routing of email.  The second, § 512(b), 
provides protection for “system caching,” which means the temporary storage 
 
 40. Id. at 1365. 
 41. Id. at 1366. 
 42. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1366. 
 43. Id. at 1374–75. 
 44. Id. at 1374. 
 45. Id. at 1375 (comparing Netcom to a radio station rebroadcasting infringing programs). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 8–9 (1998) (“Title II . . . reflects 3 months of negotiations 
supervised by Chairman Hatch and assisted by Senator Ashcroft among the major copyright 
owners and the major OSP’s and ISP’s.”). 
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 pt.1, at 11 (1998) (quoted in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Comty. 
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 50. § 512(a) (“A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a 
system or network .”). 
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of material on a network.51  Often material is stored on a network temporarily 
to allow Internet users to retrieve web pages more quickly.  The third, § 512(c), 
is the main section concerning takedown notifications and is titled, 
“Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users.”52  This 
section affects the actual website content posted by Internet users.53  Finally, 
the fourth section, § 512(d), describes information-location tools, such as 
search engines.  Liability is excused for referring or linking users to other 
websites that contain infringing material.54 
The third section, § 512(c), contains the notice-and-takedown protocol and 
the good-faith-belief requirement discussed in this article.  It provides that ISPs 
are not monetarily liable for infringing material stored “at the direction of a 
user” on the ISP’s systems as long as the ISP does not know about infringing 
material,55 does not receive direct financial benefit from them,56 and 
expeditiously removes any allegedly infringing material upon notification.57 
Section 512 describes the proper elements of a takedown notification.  The 
notification must be a written communication that states the “complaining 
party” has a “good faith belief” that “use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law.”58  Parties who do not have a good-faith belief that material on a website 
is infringing are subject to liability under § 512(f).  Specifically, any person 
who “knowingly materially misrepresents” to an ISP that material or activity is 
infringing is liable for damages incurred by the alleged infringer.59 
Several cases since 1998 illustrate how the DMCA’s § 512 has been 
treated in the courts. 
B. Diebold 
In Online Policy Group v. Diebold,60 the U.S. District Court of the 
Northern District of California held that the copyright holder, Diebold, Inc., 
 
 51. § 512(b)(1) (“A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network .”). 
 52. § 512(c)(1) (“A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a user.”). 
 53. § 512(b)(1)(A) (“the material is made available online by a person other than the service 
provider”). 
 54. § 512(d). 
 55. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 56. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 57. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 58. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).  There are other requirements for the takedown notification, but they 
are not relevant to this article. 
 59. § 512(f). Liability for knowing material misrepresentations under this section applies 
equally to Internet users who submit a counter notification to their ISP to have their material 
restored online. 
 60. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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had violated the DMCA by sending a false takedown notification.61  Diebold 
manufactures electronic voting machines, and to its chagrin, internal company 
emails that expressed concerns about security issues with the machines were 
leaked and posted on the Internet.62  Two college students posted the emails on 
their websites, where an online newspaper called IndyMedia found them and 
used them in an article criticizing Diebold.63  Diebold issued a takedown 
notification to IndyMedia’s ISP, Online Policy Group (“OPG”), causing the 
students and OPG to sue Diebold for knowingly misrepresenting copyright 
infringement.64  In court, Diebold never produced specific emails that 
contained copyrighted content65 and even admitted that some emails were 
publishable under fair use.66 
The court then held that Diebold had knowingly misrepresented infringing 
activity by sending the takedown notification.  It examined the meaning of a 
“knowing misrepresentation” under § 512(f)67: “‘Knowingly’ means that a 
party actually knew, should have known if it acted with reasonable care or 
diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good 
faith, that it was making misrepresentations.”68  Since some emails were 
“clearly subject to the fair use exception,”69 and Diebold had admitted this, it 
was simple for the court to conclude that Diebold knew they were 
misrepresenting the infringement claim in their takedown notices.70  The fact 
that Diebold never filed suit against the alleged infringers also weighed against 
them.71 
This apparent victory for Internet users accused of copyright infringement 
applied an objective reasonable-person standard.  The court said “no 
reasonable copyright holder” could have believed that emails discussing 
technical details of voting machines were protectable under copyright law,72 an 
analysis incorporating reasonableness from the definition of constructive 
 
 61. Id. at 1203. 
 62. Id. at 1197. 
 63. Id. at 1197–98. 
 64. Id. at 1198. 
 65. Online, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1204. 
 68. Id. (using the definitions of actual and constructive knowledge from Black’s Law 
Dictionary). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Online, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204. 
 71. Id. at 1204–05 (“The fact that Diebold never . . . brought suit against any alleged 
infringer suggests strongly that Diebold sought to use the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions—
which were designed to protect ISPs, not copyright holders—as a sword to suppress publication 
of embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its intellectual property.”). 
 72. Id. at 1204. 
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knowledge.73  The court’s finding that Diebold violated the DMCA’s knowing-
misrepresentation clause seemed to herald hope for future Internet users 
against oppressive takedowns.74  Only three months later, that hope was 
dashed. 
C. Michael Rossi 
Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America75 was the first case that 
directly addressed the good-faith-belief language in the DMCA.76  The DMCA 
says the copyright owner who sends a takedown notification must have a 
“good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”77  In affirming the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for the copyright owner, the Ninth 
Circuit held that only a subjective standard, not an objective reasonableness 
standard, is required.78 
Plaintiff Michael Rossi’s website, InternetMovies.com, was shut down by 
Rossi’s ISP in response to a takedown notification from the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”).79  The MPAA believed its copyrighted 
movies were being distributed illegally through Rossi’s website.  The website 
teased in numerous places, “Join to download full length movies online now! 
new movies every month,” “Full Length Downloadable Movies,” and “NOW 
DOWNLOADABLE,” while showing images from the movies.80  In fact, 
however, no movies were available.81  Rossi therefore argued that the MPAA 
“did not have sufficient information to form a good faith belief.”82  It could not 
have formed a good-faith belief that InternetMovies.com was infringing 
copyrighted works without clicking on and accessing the suspicious links.83  
According to Rossi, good-faith belief should include a reasonable investigation 
of the website.84 
 
 73. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed. 2009) (“Knowledge that one using reasonable 
care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person.”). 
 74. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Online Policy Group v. Diebold, http://www.eff.org/ 
cases/online-policy-group-v-diebold (“This landmark case set a precedent that allows other 
Internet users and their ISPs to fight back against improper copyright threats.”). 
 75. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 1004. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006) (emphasis added) 
 78. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1007. 
 79. Id. at 1001–02. 
 80. Id. at 1002. 
 81. Id. at 1003. 
 82. Id.  The district court had previously decided that the MPAA “had more than a sufficient 
basis to form the required good-faith belief.”  Id. at 1002 (quoting Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n 
of Am., Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q. 1047, 1050 (D.Haw. 2003)). 
 83. Rossi, 391 F.3d. at 1003. 
 84. Id. 
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But the court held the MPAA only needed to meet a subjective standard 
before sending its takedown notification for several reasons.85  First because 
federal statutes use subjective good faith and objective reasonableness as 
distinct standards.86  So Congress would not have written “good faith” in the 
statute if it had meant “reasonable belief.”  Second because the liability section 
of the DMCA, § 512(f), states that damages may be imposed only if the 
copyright holder knowingly materially misrepresents activities cited in the 
takedown notification.87  Knowing misrepresentation is incompatible with 
Rossi’s suggested reasonableness standard; a belief may be unreasonable 
without being a knowing misrepresentation that triggers liability under § 
512(f).88  Such a result would render the good-faith-belief requirement in § 
512(c) meaningless. 
The court also said it would be unfair to make copyright owners liable for 
being unreasonable in their belief.  “A copyright owner cannot be liable simply 
because an unknowing mistake is made.”89  Subjective good faith having been 
established, Rossi was unable to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether 
the MPAA had knowingly misrepresented that material or activity was 
infringing.  The Ninth Circuit granted the MPAA’s motion for summary 
judgment.90 
The Rossi opinion concludes with a reminder that Congress intended to 
protect Internet users accused of infringement from “subjectively improper 
actions by copyright holders.”91  Later cases and egregious takedowns suggest 
that such protection has not been taking place, as courts and copyright owners 
have relied heavily on Rossi’s subjective good-faith standard. 
D. Karen Dudnikov & Troy Augusto 
In Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, the District Court of Colorado granted 
summary judgment for the copyright holder MGA Entertainment on the 
plaintiffs’ knowing misrepresentation claim.92  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, 
the court only cited the belief by an MGA attorney that infringement was 
taking place, without any facts and without considering the plaintiffs’ first-sale 
 
 85. Id. at 1004. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under 
this section that material or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages, including 
costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright 
owner’s authorized licensee, or by a service provider.”). 
 88. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004–05. 
 89. Id. at 1005. 
 90. Id. at 1007. 
 91. Id. at 1005. 
 92. Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018 (D. Colo. 2005). 
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defense.93  The plaintiffs, Karen Dudnikov and Michael Meadors, were selling 
a fleece hat on eBay bearing a copyright-protected appliqué of a “Bratz” 
character on it.94  MGA held copyright and trademark rights in the Bratz 
characters, and when MGA discovered the auction it sent a notification to eBay 
to have the sale stopped.95  The plaintiffs sued, claiming MGA ignored 
“copyright law in an attempt to control the on-line auction market.”96  They 
were entitled by fair use and the first-sale doctrine to sell the fleece hat.97 
The court applied the subjective good-faith standard established in Rossi.98  
“[T]he Rossi decision [is] on point with regard to the salient issue in this case: 
whether MGA was entitled, based on its good-faith belief that infringement 
was occurring, to terminate the eBay auction of plaintiffs’ fleece hat.”99  MGA 
had apparently relied on the good-faith belief of its attorney,100 and that is all it 
needed.  The court imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to support 
their claim with “substantial evidence” that MGA had knowingly 
misrepresented copyright infringement.101  They had to “demonstrate material 
facts.”102  The plaintiffs were unable to raise a genuine issue of fact and lost on 
summary judgment.103  Their fair-use and first-sale arguments were not 
addressed, brushed off like lint from a fleece hat. 
Three years later the District Court for the Central District of California 
accepted a plaintiff’s first-sale defense, in UMG Recordings v. Augusto,104 
 
 93. Id. at 1013.  “The plaintiffs lawfully acquired the applique . . . [T]he subsequent re-sale 
of the item falls wholly under the First Sale Doctrine.”  Complaint of Tortious Business 
Interference, Outrageous Conduct, Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
Under Colorado Law and Perjury under 17 U.S.C. § 512 at 11, Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 
410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2003) (No. 03-D-2512) [hereinafter Complaint of 
Tortious Business Interference].  In copyright law, the first-sale doctrine is “[t]he rule that the 
purchaser of a physical copy of a copyrighted work, such as a book or CD, may give or sell that 
copy to someone else without infringing the copyright owner’s exclusive distribution rights.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (9th ed. 2009). The first-sale doctrine is included in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 94. Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. 
 95. Id.  MGA notified eBay using eBay’s Verified Rights Owner’s Program, yet the court 
construed the notification as a DMCA takedown.  It applied both § 512(f), prohibiting “knowing 
material misrepresentations that a material or activity is infringing,” and § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), 
requiring “good faith belief,” to MGA’s notification.  Id. at 1011–12. 
 96. Id. at 1011. 
 97. Complaint of Tortious Business Interference, supra note 93, at 5–6, 11. 
 98. Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.  The magistrate judge who first ruled on the case 
noted the lack of authority on this issue and considered Rossi.  Id. at 1016 n.3. 
 99. Id. at 1017. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1012. 
 102. Id. at 1013. 
 103. Id. 
 104. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
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finding no copyright infringement.  But it also relied on Rossi in holding that 
the copyright owner had not knowingly misrepresented its infringement 
claim.105 
In June 2008, UMG Recordings sued Troy Augusto for copyright 
infringement for selling “personal use only” promotional CDs on eBay.106  
UMG had sent the CDs to key individuals hoping to produce publicity for the 
upcoming public release of the official CDs.107  Augusto bought the CDs from 
shops and sold them on eBay as “rare collectibles.”108 
In response to UMG’s suit, Augusto counterclaimed that UMG had 
knowingly misrepresented copyright infringement when it sent a DMCA 
takedown notification to eBay and squelched Augusto’s auctions.109  Relying 
on the subjective good-faith standard, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of UMG on Augusto’s counterclaim.110  While the court did not seem to 
impose a burden of proof on UMG, it found that UMG had sufficient 
information to form its good-faith belief: (1) Augusto had once admitted that 
selling promotional CDs was copyright infringement, (2) the wording on the 
promotional CDs led UMG to believe it held copyright interests in the CDs, 
and (3) “UMG . . . carefully documented Augusto’s actions in preparation for 
this lawsuit.”111 
Augusto responded that since the first-sale doctrine gave him the right to 
sell the CDs, UMG’s takedown notification was a knowing 
misrepresentation.112  Yet, much as fair use determinations are not always 
clear, the law of the first-sale doctrine was unclear in this particular context,113 
and because UMG had factually demonstrated its subjective good-faith belief, 
the court granted summary judgment for UMG.114 
This ruling was an improvement over Dudnikov because the court 
considered the evidentiary basis for UMG’s good-faith belief; it did not simply 
accept an attorney’s self-serving statement.  Also unlike Dudnikov, the court 
credited the first-sale doctrine, even though it ultimately found the law was not 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. UMG labeled the promotional CDs “personal use only,” and said that “[r]esale or 
transfer [was] not allowed.”  Id. at 1058. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 1065. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. The court had to determine, among other things, whether the language on the 
promotional CDs created a license or a sale according to “economic realities.”  Id. at 1060. 
 114. Id. at 1065 (“Augusto’s allegations . . . do not create a genuine issue of material fact . . . 
given the uncertainty of the law in this area.”). 
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clear enough to impute knowing misrepresentation and bad-faith belief to the 
copyright owner. 
III.  STEPHANIE LENZ 
This brings us to Lenz v. Universal Music Corporation,115 also known as 
the “Dancing Baby Case.”  In Lenz—which is still being litigated at this 
time116—the plaintiff, Stephanie Lenz, survived a motion to dismiss her 
complaint, which stated that Universal Music Corporation knowingly 
misrepresented that Lenz’s video infringed its copyright.  In February 2007, 
Stephanie Lenz posted a video to the YouTube website for her friends and 
family to see her one-year-old son, Holden, dancing.117  In the background one 
can hear about 20 seconds of Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy.”118  Universal 
sent a takedown notification119 to YouTube to have the video removed.120  
YouTube removed the video one day later and alerted Ms. Lenz that “any 
repeated incidents of copyright infringement could lead to the deletion of her 
account and all her videos.”121  After consulting an attorney, Ms. Lenz sent a 
counter notification pursuant to § 512(g)(3) to have her video re-posted, which 
YouTube eventually did six weeks later.122  She then brought a lawsuit against 
Universal in July 2007 for violating the DMCA’s knowing-misrepresentation 
clause in § 512(f), which the court dismissed with leave to amend.123  Lenz had 
relied on the definition of “knowledge” in the Diebold case, saying Universal 
“knew or should have known” that Lenz’s video was not infringing.124  But 
Diebold was distinguishable; for instance, Diebold’s emails were not protected 
 
 115. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 116. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47873 (N.D. Cal. April 20, 2010). 
 117. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
 118. The court noted that the song can only be heard “with difficulty.”  Id. 
 119. The court rejected Universal’s argument that its notice was not a DMCA takedown 
notification. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(B)(6) at 1, Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Case 
No. CV 07-03783), 2008 WL 2242356. 
 120. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
 121. Id. 
 122. It is unclear why replacing the video took YouTube so long.  The putback provision of § 
512 only relieves service providers of liability for removal of material if the provider follows the 
steps outlined in § 512(g)(2)—one of which is to replace the removed material in not more than 
14 business days following receipt of the counter notification (unless the sender of the takedown 
notification petitions for a court order to restrain the subscriber from further infringement).  17 
U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2006). 
 123. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783, 2008 WL 962102, at *1–*3 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 8, 2008). 
 124. Id. at *2. 
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by copyright, whereas Prince’s song was clearly protected.125  And most 
importantly Lenz had failed to “allege facts from which misrepresentation may 
be inferred,”126 having only pleaded fair use was “self-evident.”127 
After Lenz filed a renewed complaint, Universal fired back its second 
motion to dismiss.128  This time, however, on August 20, 2008, Judge Fogel 
denied the motion.129  Lenz’s complaint again alleged that Universal 
knowingly misrepresented that her video was infringing in violation of § 
512(f).130  The court phrased the issue as “[w]hether § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires 
a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a good faith 
belief that ‘use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized 
by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.’”131  Universal did not consider 
the law, Lenz challenged, specifically the fair-use exception to copyright 
infringement.  It was only acting to appease its client Prince. Prince had been 
outspoken about keeping his music off of the Internet,132 and Lenz quoted 
Universal saying, 
Prince believes it is wrong for YouTube . . . to appropriate his music without 
his consent.  That position has nothing to do with any particular video that uses 
his songs.  It’s simply a matter of principle . . . .  That’s why, over the last few 
months, we have asked YouTube to remove thousands of different videos that 
use Prince music without his permission.133 
Whether the copyright holder must consider fair use before sending a 
takedown notification was an issue of first impression.134  Universal responded 
that § 512(c)(3)(A) does not mention fair use, and that fair use should only 
become a consideration after a takedown notification is sent, when the 
copyright holder is considering whether to file suit.135  The court looked at the 
wording of the statute, which says “authorized by . . . the law.”136  And the law 
 
 125. Id. at *3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *2–*3. 
 128. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 129. Id. at 1151. 
 130. Id. at 1153. 
 131. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006)). 
 132. Id. at 1152; see also Chris Francescani, The Home Video Prince Doesn’t Want You to 
See, ABC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3777651&page=2 (“A 
well-placed source directly involved in the situation confirmed to ABC News that Prince was 
directly involved in seeking the takedown of Lenz’s video.  ‘This guy scours the Internet,’ the 
source said of the legendary artist, who once changed his name to an unpronounceable symbol 
and wrote the word ‘Slave’ on his cheek until he won back the rights to his music from another 
publishing company.”). 
 133. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152–53 (quoting Francescani, supra note 132). 
 134. Id. at 1154. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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in question is section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, describing fair use.137  
“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown 
notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to 
state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”138  
By requiring consideration of fair use, the DMCA successfully balances 
copyright owners’ need to react quickly to potential infringement against 
Internet users’ interest in “‘not having material removed without recourse.’”139 
Whether an allegedly infringing work satisfies fair use is fact specific,140 
and Universal expressed concern that it would not be able to know whether 
potentially infringing material posted to the Internet was fair use.141  Even if a 
copyright holder such as Universal did turn out to be wrong on such a question, 
however, being wrong is not subjective bad faith as required by Rossi.142  The 
court added, 
The DMCA already requires copyright owners to make an initial review of the 
potentially infringing material prior to sending a takedown notice; indeed, it 
would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of Section 512(c) without 
doing so. A consideration of the applicability of the fair use doctrine simply is 
part of that initial review.143 
There was just enough evidence of “bad faith and deliberate ignorance” in 
Lenz’s complaint to survive dismissal.144  Lenz pointed out that Universal is a 
sophisticated corporation familiar with copyright actions, and the fact that 
Prince was vocal about protecting his work suggested that Universal was 
merely appeasing him.145  The court concluded by saying “[it] has considerable 
doubt that Lenz will be able to prove that Universal acted with the subjective 
bad faith required by Rossi, and following discovery her claims well may [sic] 
be appropriate for summary judgment.”146 
A copyright scholar once said that determining what is fair use is like 
trying to nail jelly to a wall.147  Even so, it will be a shame if this case turns out 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55. 
 139. Id. at 1155 (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998)). 
 140. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1993) (“The task is not to be 
simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-
case analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
 141. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. Of course this is the same as the uncertainty about the 
first-sale doctrine in UMG v. Augusto. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1156. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
 147. Prof. Francis M. Nevins, Copyright lecture at St. Louis University School of Law 
(Spring 2009). 
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like Augusto—that because of uncertainty in the law, the copyright owner did 
not knowingly misrepresent infringement in its takedown notification.  Joseph 
Gratz, former chair of the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law’s Special 
Committee on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, remarked, “If an attorney 
for Universal had examined the video, counsel would have recognized that the 
snippet of a Prince song . . . was almost certainly not infringement, but fair 
use.”148  Hence “[b]uilding some due process back into the system is 
necessary.”149 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The scarcity of judgments in favor of Internet users150 shows that proving 
copyright owners’ subjective bad faith is extremely challenging.  The plaintiffs 
in Online Policy Group v. Diebold succeeded only because the defendant 
admitted that its emails were not protected by copyright law.151  Since the 
DMCA was enacted in 1998, Diebold has been the only sender of a takedown 
notification held liable for knowing misrepresentation of claimed infringement 
or bad-faith belief, even though copyright owners have been sending millions 
of takedown notifications.152  One study found that over one-third of takedown 
notifications contained major flaws.153  The same study observed that 41% of 
notifications targeted business competitors,154 which prompts the question 
whether the senders were trying to protect their intellectual property in good 
faith.  Can it be true that so many copyright owners, sending so many flawed 
notifications, so seldom misrepresent infringement claims? 
A. Factual Basis for Good-Faith Belief 
There is tension between Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America 
and Lenz v. Universal Music Corporation over what copyright owners must do 
before they can justifiably send a takedown notification.  According to Rossi, 
the copyright owner only needs subjective good-faith belief and does not need 
to conduct a full investigation of the website, let alone consider defenses such 
 
 148. Seidenberg, supra note 17, at 48. 
 149. Urban & Quilter, supra note 9, at 689. 
 150. One business owner whose website was removed due to a competitor’s takedown 
notifications was unable to cite any cases in support of his claim of knowing misrepresentation 
against the competitor. Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(noting the case law in the circuit was “sparse”). 
 151. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal 2004). 
 152. Delaney, supra note 11 (copyright-enforcement company Bay TSP sends over one 
million takedown notices each month); Greg Sandoval, For YouTube Videos, a “Fair Use” 
Boost, CNET NEWS, (2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10022304-93.html (Viacom has 
sent 350,000 takedown notices to YouTube). 
 153. Urban & Quilter, supra note 9, at 666. 
 154. Id. at 655. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] NOTICE, TAKEDOWN, AND THE GOOD-FAITH STANDARD 629 
as fair use.  But in order to have good faith, the copyright owner must have 
reviewed the offending website to some degree.  The question is, to what 
degree? 
When discussing Rossi, commentators do not discuss the MPAA’s actual 
review of Michael Rossi’s website.  Typically they state broadly that the 
holding of Rossi was a subjective good-faith standard.155  Even Lenz cites 
Rossi that way.156  In fact a third party notified the MPAA of possible 
infringement by Rossi, and in response an MPAA employee personally 
reviewed the website.157  The website’s text claimed that full movies were 
“NOW DOWNLOADABLE.”158  The court said such claims virtually 
compelled the conclusion that movies were being distributed in violation of 
copyright.159 
Rossi argued that all the MPAA had to do was click the links on the 
website to verify that no movies were actually available.  Indeed, not clicking 
the links suggests that a superficial look at a website suffices to form a good-
faith belief.  But in order to access those links, the MPAA employee would 
have had to register with Rossi’s website and agree to his terms of service.160  
Registering with the website is exactly the kind of onerous requirement that 
would hinder copyright owners from adequately protecting their work.  Thus 
the commonly stated subjective-good-faith holding is only part of the Rossi 
holding.  The MPAA did review the website, was misled, and had a factual 
basis for its good-faith belief.161 
The Lenz court does not speak about a factual basis for good-faith belief, 
even though it said the copyright owner must conduct an “initial review” of the 
potentially infringing website.162  The court did not discuss the steps Universal 
went through to identify infringing material in the video.  But Lenz only 
decided the sufficiency of the complaint, whereas in Rossi it was a motion for 
summary judgment and more facts were available.  As discussed above, in 
Rossi the MPAA employee personally read Rossi’s website (although he or she 
did not register).  And claims on the website compelled the conclusion that 
 
 155. See, e.g., Matt Williams, The Truth and “Truthiness” About Knowing Material 
Misrepresentations, 9 N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 28 (Fall 2007); Charles J. Biederman and Danny 
Andrews, Applying Copyright Law to User-Generated Content, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 15–16 
(“a subjective and not an objective good faith belief is the requisite standard for sending a 
takedown notice”). 
 156. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56. 
 157. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 30–31, Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-16034). 
 161. Id. at 30 (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 234–35 (1959)). 
 162. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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movies were being distributed.  So the MPAA had some factual basis for its 
good-faith belief.  In Lenz, Universal’s employees only needed to play the 
YouTube video to hear Prince’s song.  There were no misleading claims 
though.  So, assuming employees watched the video, Universal had at least 
some factual basis for its good-faith belief, but less than the MPAA did.  If, on 
the other hand, they did not watch the video and only read the title, “Let’s Go 
Crazy #1,” they had no evidence of infringement, only conjecture and 
suspicion. 
B. Legal Basis for Good-Faith Belief 
Unlike Lenz, Rossi did not address whether the copyright owner must 
consider fair use and other infringement defenses when sending the takedown 
notification.  The different legal contexts explain this.  Namely, fair use was 
not an available defense in Rossi like it was in Lenz. Copyright-infringement 
claims require showing that the defendant violated one of the exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner: copying, adaptation, distribution, public performance, 
public display, and public performance via digital-audio transmission.163  Only 
certain defenses are available against each of those exclusive rights.  The first-
sale defense used in Augusto, for instance, is only available against the right of 
distribution.164  In Rossi, offering illegal movies for download would have 
violated the MPAA’s distribution right,165 and the fair-use defense is not 
available against distribution.166  Lenz involved Universal’s right to copy, and 
fair use is often a strong defense against that particular right.167 
 
 163. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6) (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work . . 
. to prepare derivative works . . . to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work . . . 
to perform the copyrighted work publicly . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly; and in the 
case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”). 
 164. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3),” where § 106(3) is the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public.” (emphasis added). § 106(3). 
 165. § 106(3) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . to distribute copies 
and phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending.”). 
 166. Distributing an entire copyrighted work almost certainly infringes copyright because 
“[i]n determining whether the use made of a work . . . is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include . . . the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole.”  17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row Publ’rs, 
Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 548–49 (1985) (magazine’s use of even “generous verbatim 
excerpts” was not fair use). 
 167. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(B)(6) at 4, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 
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Fair use is described in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which lists four factors to weigh 
in deciding whether a use is infringing or not: the purpose and character of the 
use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the entire work, and the effect of the use on the 
potential market for the copyrighted work.168  The last factor weighs heavily in 
the fair-use determination,169 and Stephanie Lenz’s video cannot have 
seriously affected Prince’s potential market.  Lenz posted the video to share 
with family members, and perhaps a dozen people would have seen it.  In 
addition, given the low audio quality and shortness of the clip, it could not 
have substituted for Prince fans purchasing his CDs.  Thus in terms of legal 
defenses, fair use was a strong argument for Lenz that was not available to 
Rossi. 
Now that a court has recognized fair use in an Internet user’s complaint, 
one can ask whether other defenses to infringement must be considered by 
copyright owners.  Need copyright owners consider so-called thin copyright, 
such as when the work consists largely of facts in the public domain?170  Short 
phrases such as titles?171  And other uncopyrightable elements?172  Not likely.  
Even Lenz’s fair-use argument is unlikely to survive summary judgment 
according to the judge.173  If a major music company’s legal department 
honestly believes a home video of a dancing toddler infringed its copyright, 
then fair use has negligible meaning.  At the current stage of jurisprudence 
involving the DMCA’s takedown provision, it is not likely that thin copyright 
and other defenses will gain traction for Internet users either. Something more 
is needed. 
C. Shift the Burden of Proof 
Courts should consider the fact that no judge reviews the allegation in a 
takedown notification unless litigation ensues.  And then the Internet user must 
attempt to prove the alleged copyright owner’s bad faith.  To restore balance, 
 
1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Case No. CV 07-03783) (claiming Lenz violated Universal’s 
synchronization right, which derives from the right to copy). 
 168. § 107. 
 169. Harper & Row Publ’rs v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This last factor is 
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”). 
 170. Proven Methods Seminars, LLC v. Am. Grants & Affordable Hous. Inst., 519 F. Supp. 
2d 1057, 1067 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (denying plaintiff’s preliminary injunction because the 
copyrighted work consisted of facts and ideas in the public domain, rendering copyright 
protection “thin”). 
 171. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2009). 
 172. See Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(allegedly infringing text on competitor’s website was industry jargon, as well as minimal, and 
therefore not infringing). 
 173. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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courts should allocate the burden of proving good-faith belief on the copyright 
owner.  Is it fair for the Internet user to try to prove a subjective belief?  To 
divine whether the copyright owner was being honest?  The user can hardly 
know what steps the copyright owner went through to evaluate the allegedly 
infringing material; for instance, whether human beings or only computer 
software scanned the website.174  One software company that searches the 
Internet for copyright infringement and piracy says it considers fair use and 
advises its clients about fair use.175  But how would a user know such a 
consultation took place? 
During discovery, Lenz moved to compel production of communications 
between Universal and Prince.176  Universal claimed attorney-client privilege 
and work product, and refused.  Fortunately it lost that gambit,177 but it will be 
easy in the future for copyright owners and agents to structure their 
communications so that they are privileged.  Note also that in Augusto, UMG 
offered evidence that it had “carefully documented Augusto’s actions in 
preparation for [the] lawsuit.”178  Had that evidence been harmful to UMG, it 
could have claimed it was work product. 
The copyright owner should be required to describe the steps it took and 
persuade the court of its good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.  This 
is not a proposal for a reasonable investigation, only that the copyright owner 
need come forward with evidence sufficient to form a good-faith belief.179  For 
legitimate complaints and honest mistakes, this will be easy to do and will not 
chill the rights of copyright owners;180 they should already have such 
information from their initial review of the website, as the DMCA requires.181 
 
 174. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(noting the MPAA initially identifies potentially infringing websites with the Ranger software 
program, after which employees review the website). 
 175. Email from James Graham, Principal of Jim Graham Public Relations, to author (Jan. 15, 
2009) (on file with Saint Louis University Public Law Review). 
 176. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105180 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 177. Id. at *4–*5 (finding that the specific agreement between Universal and Prince was a 
business agreement, not legal, and rejecting the work-product claim only because Universal failed 
to raise it earlier). 
 178. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 179. In finding the MPAA had sufficient information, the Rossi court first looked at the 
information on Rossi’s website then at what the MPAA did in response to that information.  
Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005. 
 180. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(rejecting “likelihood of success on the merits” as the standard for copyright owners). 
 181. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (“The DMCA already requires copyright owners to make 
an initial review of the potentially infringing material prior to sending the takedown notice . . . .”). 
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Moreover, in copyright-infringement actions the burden of proof is 
crucial.182  For example, because copyright protection does not require 
approval or verification by a federal authority, as is the case with patents,183 
plaintiffs who allege copyright infringement must first establish that their work 
is protectable by copyright. In the seminal Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, the plaintiff had to establish that his photograph had sufficient 
“originality,” “intellectual production,” and “conception on the part of the 
author” to be a protected work under the Copyright Act.184 
Another burden-of-proof issue in copyright litigation arises with the first-
sale doctrine. The first-sale doctrine is “[t]he rule that a copyright owner, after 
conveying the title to a particular copy of the protected work, . . . cannot 
interfere with later sales or distributions by the new owner.”185  In civil cases, 
courts put the burden of proving the first-sale defense on the defendant, as one 
might expect.186  Thus the defendant (seller) must prove that the plaintiff 
(copyright owner) previously conveyed title to copies of the work.187  In 
Augusto, for example, Augusto needed to prove that UMG had sold or given 
away its promotional CDs before he bought them.  In criminal cases, however, 
the courts are split over which party should carry that burden.188 
Addressing first sale, Prof. Nimmer suggests the current allocation in civil 
cases is wrong and that in both civil and criminal cases, the burden of proof 
should be on the plaintiff-copyright owner instead of the defendant.  This 
means the plaintiff must first prove he or she did not sell or give away a copy 
of the work in question.189  “It is true that this requires the plaintiff to prove a 
negative,” Nimmer says, “but the result nevertheless appears justified in that it 
involves ‘a matter uniquely within the knowledge of the plaintiff.’”190 
 
 182. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11 (“The most critical question in litigation often boils 
down to which party bears the burden of proof.”); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 28, at 36. 
 183. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.  See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884) (the commissioner of patents ensures the validity of patents; 
whereas copyright law does not have such “examination by a proper tribunal”) (cited in Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991)). 
 184. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 58–60.  Today registration of copyright establishes the prima facie 
validity of the copyright.  17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006) (cited in 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12.11[A][1]). 
 185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (9th ed. 2009); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 186. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 187. Id.  He also must prove the copies of the work were lawfully manufactured, that he was 
the lawful owner of the copies and that he disposed of but did not reproduce additional copies.  
Id. 
 188. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 101-106 (some courts impose the burden of proof on the government, 
others on the defendant). 
 189. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11. 
 190. Id. at 12.11[E]. (quoting Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (N.D. 
Ill. 1975)). 
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Nimmer’s argument carries even stronger force when applied to the 
DMCA’s good-faith requirement.  With DMCA takedown notices, if the 
burden were shifted to the copyright owners, they would not have to prove a 
negative to demonstrate their good-faith belief.  And, as with the first-sale 
plaintiff, the factual basis of copyright owners’ good-faith belief is uniquely 
within their own knowledge.  Only the copyright owners know precisely how 
they evaluated the website before sending the takedown. 
Another reason to shift the burden of proof is the takedown procedure’s 
resemblance to an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”).  TROs apply 
to copyright impoundment actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(f).191  They resemble the DMCA’s takedown provisions in that their 
rationale is based on rapid response and preventing economic harm to 
copyright owners.  Giving notice to the alleged infringer can cause 
counterfeited goods to disappear and be sold before the copyright action can be 
adjudicated.192  Proponents of a TRO must meet the same high standard as a 
preliminary injunction,193 including likelihood of success on the merits and a 
showing of irreparable harm.194  The key difference between TROs and the 
current DMCA takedown procedure is that TROs do, in accordance with due 
process, require approval by a judge.  In addition, the TRO plaintiff is subject 
to sanctions if the judge finds no basis for the copyright-infringement claim.195 
In Diebold the plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that a preliminary-
injunction standard should be used to evaluate Diebold’s takedown notices.196  
They said Diebold should have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of 
its copyright-infringement allegation.197  The court disagreed, saying that such 
a high standard would “chill the rights of copyright owners”198 and that it 
would be equivalent to an objective standard.199  So copyright owners should 
not have to meet the high TRO standard.  Rather, when copyright owners order 
the removal of Internet users’ online content without an evaluation by a 
 
 191. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b), (f).  See, e.g., Epic Games, Inc. v. Altmeyer, 2008 WL 4853634 
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2008) (“Rule 65(f) specifically provides that [Rule 65(b)] applies to copyright 
impoundment proceedings”). 
 192. Harvey Shapiro, Ex Parte Applications for the Seizure of Counterfeit Goods Under the 
Copyright Act, Practicing Law Institute, Oct. 2, 2002, Oct. 23, 2002 (PLI Order No. G0-014P). 
 193. K-2 Corp. v. Body Glove Int’l, LLC, 2009 WL 87446, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2009). 
 194. Id. (Both the traditional and the alternative tests require the movant to show that it will 
suffer irreparable harm if relief is denied and that it will “probably prevail on the merits.”  Id.  
The alternative test also permits relief upon a showing that the balance of hardships “tips sharply 
in [the movant’s] favor”).  Id. 
 195. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553–54 (1991). 
 196. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal 2004). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (describing “likelihood of success on the merits” as “objectively measured”). 
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judge—sometimes without any notice to the user200—shifting the burden of 
proof and requiring copyright owners to substantiate their good-faith belief is 
an equitable solution. 
Finally, it is fundamental to rules of evidence that courts can shift the 
burden of proof or the burden of production to the party with greater 
knowledge of the facts or more available evidence.201  A party does not 
generally bear the burden of proof and production on issues “peculiarly within 
the knowledge the adversary.”202  For example, a bailor alleging a bailee has 
negligently damaged the bailor’s goods shifts the burden of proof to the bailee 
merely by showing that the goods were delivered to the bailee intact.203  This is 
because circumstances of the damage are peculiarly within the bailee’s 
knowledge.204  The bailee must then prove that he or she exercised due care.205 
In the context of the DMCA, copyright owners know the factual basis of 
their good-faith belief and have peculiar access to that knowledge.  In Lenz, 
Universal knows how it discovered the YouTube video, who reviewed it, 
whether its legal staff considered fair use, and whether Prince instigated the 
takedown notification himself.  Universal has greater knowledge than Lenz 
could have, and the facts are peculiarly within Universal’s knowledge.  In the 
case of a bailment, the bailor at least interacts with the bailee and has access to 
relevant evidence, such as the condition of the building in which the bailee 
stored the goods.  But Stephanie Lenz had never interacted directly with 
Universal and cannot know the inner workings of Universal’s legal 
department.  She is at a severe disadvantage.  Shifting the burden of proof to 
Universal would be an equitable solution. 
This burden shift would make clear when copyright owners cannot 
establish a prima facie case of infringement, as in Diebold,206 and when the 
 
 200. Chloe Lake, Bands and Fans Caught in Warner Music Copyright Crackdown on 
YouTube, NEWS.COM.AU, Jan. 31, 2009, http://www.news.com.au/music-silenced-in-youtube-
crackdown/story-0-1111118708654 (fifteen-year-old Juliet Weybret’s YouTube video of her 
cover version of “Winter Wonderland” was removed without advance notice, as were official 
videos uploaded to YouTube by the bands Death Cab for Cutie and Led Zeppelin). 
 201. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 196 (citing Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal. App. 4th 
1157, 1190 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2008) (in a dispute between employees and employer over city’s 
living wage ordinance, the court applied burden shift to the employer to show which employees 
did and did not work on city projects, because the employer was in the best position to know)). 
 202. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 203. 
 203. Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 102 S.E. 313, 314 (N.C. 1920) (quoting Hanes v. Shapiro & 
Smith, 84 S.E. 33, 37 (N.C. 1915)). 
 204. Id. (citing Nutt v. Davison, 131 P. 390, 391 (Colo. 1913)). 
 205. Id. at 315 (“[T]he failure to return the property does devolve upon the defendant the 
burden of going forward with proof to show that it discharged its duty of requisite care of the 
property while in its custody.”). 
 206. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D.Cal. 2004) 
(takedown sender never identified emails that were copyrighted). 
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Internet user has a strong case for fair use, as in Lenz.207  It would prevent a 
case like Dudnikov being decided based on the conclusory statement of an 
attorney.208  Recall that in Dudnikov the court imposed the burden of proof on 
the plaintiffs to support their knowing-misrepresentation claim with 
“substantial evidence.”  Had the burden of proving good faith been put on 
copyright owner, MGA would have had to explain why the sale of the fleece 
hat was not permitted by the first-sale doctrine.  Assuming MGA had 
information sufficient to form a good-faith belief, it could still easily have 
avoided liability.  The proposed burden shift would also dissuade frivolous 
takedown senders who remove campaign videos in the heat of a presidential 
election, as news stations did to both John McCain and Barack Obama in 
2008.209 
Despite the importance of burden of proof, the effect of the DMCA’s 
takedown provisions has been to allow the copyright owners to escape any 
burden.210  The copyright owners send takedown notifications attesting good-
faith belief, and the ISPs promptly remove the offending material.  If the 
Internet users sue, they must prove bad faith.  To be sure, Congress designed 
the takedown procedure to protect copyright owners against “massive 
piracy.”211  But Congress also provided “important procedural protections for 
individual Internet users to ensure that they will not be mistakenly denied 
access to the World Wide Web.”212  Those procedural protections, including 
the good-faith requirement and liability for knowing misrepresentations, ought 
to be given their due.213  Requiring copyright owners to conduct an initial 
review of websites sufficient to form good-faith belief and shifting the burden 
of proving good-faith belief to copyright owners would accomplish Congress’s 
goal. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has recognized fair use as a fundamental protection of 
the First Amendment against copyright law.214  Similarly the U.S. Court of 
 
 207. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D.Cal 2008) (complaint 
alleged “sufficient allegations . . . of deliberate ignorance of fair use to survive the . . . motion to 
dismiss”). 
 208. Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (D. Colo. 2005). 
 209. Lessig, supra note 16. 
 210. Ordinarily the plaintiff must prove ownership, authorship, and fixation; or at least submit 
proof of copyright registration in order to establish a presumption in favor of those elements.  
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 28. 
 211. S. REP. NO. 105–90, at 8 (1998). 
 212. Id. at 9. 
 213. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 214. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations . . . the ‘fair use’ defense codified at § 107 allows the public to use 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has underscored that a copyright owner who 
sends a takedown notification swears under penalty of perjury: “Accusations of 
alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A user could have content 
removed, or may have his access terminated entirely.  If the content infringes, 
justice has been done.  But if it does not, speech protected under the First 
Amendment could be removed.”215 
During the 2008 presidential election campaign, both candidates had 
campaign videos removed from the Internet due to allegations of copyright 
infringement.216  As political speech, the campaign videos were certainly fair 
use.  Yet that did not temper brazen news stations from sending DMCA 
takedown notifications to remove the videos.  The news stations knew then and 
know now that the DMCA’s § 512(f) is impotent.  Ultimately the burden  of  
proving  bad  faith is  simply too high, and  Internet users are not in position to 
carry it.  Perhaps the story of a toddler just learning to walk will help put the 




not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself for limited 
purposes.”). 
 215. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining why a 
DMCA takedown notification is ineffective if the sender has not declared “under penalty of 
perjury . . . that he has a good-faith belief that the material is unlicensed.”). 
 216. Lessig, supra note 16. 
 217. Ms. Lenz reports that her son Holden has moved on from Prince and is now grooving to 
grunge. Francescani, supra note 132. Stay tuned. 
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